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What	was	wrong	with	the	Brexit	referendum	and	what
would	be	wrong	with	a	second
Depending	on	their	design,	referendums	can	be	bad	for	democracy,	writes	Joseph	Lacey.	He
argues	that	the	central	problem	with	the	Brexit	referendum	was	its	ad	hoc	nature.	Any	second
referendum	would	be	of	a	similar	sort	and	so	should	be	avoided.	But	there	is	a	way	of	legitimately
deciding	upon	questions	of	EU	membership:	through	the	mandatory	referendum.
A	common	complaint	of	those	who	voted	to	remain	in	the	EU	is	that	the	referendum	should	have
never	happened.	The	UK	is	a	representative	democracy,	they	say,	where	Parliament	is	sovereign.
How	on	earth	can	such	a	complex	issue	as	membership	of	the	EU	be	decided	by	the	people	in	an	informed	and
balanced	way?	Don’t	we	elect	representatives	in	order	to	make	these	complex	decisions	for	us?
By	contrast,	referendums	to	join	the	EU	have	become	the	new	norm,	with	ten	of	the	last	eleven	member	states	to	join
have	done	so	following	referendums.	The	rationale	is	simple:	becoming	part	of	the	EU	is	a	decision	so	momentous
that	it	requires	the	direct	legitimation	of	the	people.	For	similar	reasons,	it	would	be	difficult	to	justify	in	principle,	or
imagine	in	practice,	a	country	leaving	the	EU	without	a	referendum	of	some	kind.
In	fact,	the	very	Remainers	who	decried	the	2016	referendum	are	unlikely	to	have	resisted	the	demand	for	a
referendum	if	the	decision	to	leave	the	EU	was	taken	solely	by	parliamentary	fiat.	No	more	evidence	for	this
hypothetical	is	required	than	the	planned	legal	challenge	to	the	government	recently	proposed	by	the	anti-Brexit
pressure	group	Best	for	Britain.	Their	case	is	that	the	2011	European	Act,	passed	by	Parliament,	requires	a
referendum	on	any	withdrawal	agreement	between	the	UK	and	the	EU	because	such	a	deal	would	necessarily
involve	transferring	competences	to	the	EU	during	any	transition	period.	The	democratic	argument	motivating	their
legal	challenge,	however,	is	that	such	a	major	decision	should	not	be	made	without	the	direct	consent	of	the	people.
There	may	be	good	reasons	to	resist	the	use	of	referendums.	But	it	is	nevertheless	difficult	to	contend	with	the
democratic	force	of	the	rationale	for	referendums	on	EU	membership	issues.	And,	in	any	case,	it	seems	that	there
are	few	circumstances	in	which	citizens	would	settle	for	less	in	any	EU	country.	It	is	therefore	worth	reflecting	on	the
question	of	how	withdrawal	referendums	from	the	EU	should	be	designed,	because	neither	the	Brexit	referendum	nor
any	subsequent	vote	would	be	able	to	meet	the	basic	conditions	of	a	well-designed	referendum.
The	design	problem	of	the	UK’s	EU	referendum
The	central	design	problem	of	the	2016	referendum	was	its	ad	hoc	nature.	Ad	hoc	referendums	are	those	that	are
not	legally	required,	but	rather	called	at	the	will	of	political	representatives.	These	are	problematic	because	of	the
ease	with	which	they	can	become	tools	to	gain	political	advantage	or	relieve	political	pressure.	In	other	words,	ad
hoc	referendums	are	highly	susceptible	to	being	called	for	party	political	reasons,	rather	than	the	democratic
rightfulness	of	consulting	the	people	on	an	important	issue.	It	is	not	difficult	for	citizens	to	pick	up	on	such
disingenuous	motives.	Meanwhile,	those	who	stand	to	lose	from	the	referendum	are	likely	to	view	it	as	an	illegitimate
attempt	to	change	the	rules	of	the	game	–	circumventing	the	normal	parliamentary	decision-making	procedure	for
some	secondary	political	end.
The	Brexit	referendum	unfortunately	took	on	a	dynamic	of	precisely	this	kind.	The	promise	of	a	referendum	on	EU
membership	was	primarily	an	electoral	gambit	by	David	Cameron,	who	wanted	to	appease	the	Eurosceptical
members	of	his	Conservative	Party	and	neutralize	the	electoral	threat	of	UKIP.	Precisely	because	of	the	transparent
electoral	opportunism	motivating	the	referendum,	and	the	failure	of	the	government	to	articulate	in	advance	what
leaving	the	EU	would	mean	in	practice,	the	legitimacy	of	the	vote	was	in	doubt	from	the	beginning,	and	vocally	called
into	question	by	the	losers	–	the	48%	who	voted	to	Remain.
The	tragicomic	nature	of	the	UK-EU	withdrawal	negotiations	is	a	direct	result	of	the	kind	of	political	gambling	made
possible	by	the	opportunity	for	ad	hoc	referendums.	Essentially,	the	government	is	now	faced	with	the	task	of
implementing	a	decision	which	it	did	not	support,	and	for	which	there	was	no	plan	in	place.	The	meaning	of	“Brexit
means	Brexit”	has	had	to	be	worked	through	after	the	fact.
What	would	have	been	a	more	sensible	referendum	design
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We	must	remember	that	referendums	are	supposed	to	be	a	check	on	the	power	of	our	representatives,	to	stop	them
acting	against	our	best	interests.	Referendums	are	not	supposed	to	be	tools	in	the	hands	of	our	representatives	to	be
used	for	party	political	purposes.	The	mandatory	referendum	serves	as	the	main	alternative	to	ad	hoc	referendums.
Rather	than	allowing	the	government	or	parliament	to	simply	call	a	referendum	at	will,	mandatory	referendums	legally
stop	the	government	from	making	some	decision	without	the	direct	approval	of	the	people	through	popular	vote.
Let	us	imagine	a	mandatory	referendum	legally	instituted	for	the	question	of	withdrawal	from	the	EU.	On	this
scenario,	the	national	parliament	would	be	first	required	to	pass	legislation	to	access	Article	50	of	the	Treaty	on
European	Union	on	withdrawal	from	the	EU.	The	government	would	then	be	legally	prevented	from	putting	this
legislation	into	effect	until	it	had	been	approved	by	a	binding	national	referendum.
Not	only	would	this	be	the	most	democratic	arrangement	by	giving	the	people	the	final	say	over	their	EU
membership,	but	it	would	also	set	out	well	in	advance	the	decision-making	procedure	for	these	kinds	of	issues.	In
this	way,	all	actors	will	be	aware	of	the	rules	of	the	game	before	the	question	of	withdrawal	even	arises.	Because	the
proposed	type	of	referendum	is	necessary,	and	therefore	predictable,	while	serving	as	a	check	on	the	government’s
power	rather	than	as	a	tool	for	electoral	manipulation,	the	result	will	be	democratically	legitimate	and	far	more	likely
to	be	perceived	as	such.	Importantly,	to	the	extent	that	the	government	is	required	to	register	its	intention	to	trigger
Article	50	in	advance	of	a	referendum,	one	can	presume	that	a	rational	plan	of	action	for	post-EU	membership	would
be	formulated	from	the	beginning.
The	aim	of	this	proposal	is	not	to	make	it	impossible	for	states	to	leave	the	EU.	Rather,	the	point	is	to	ensure	that	it	is
possible	for	a	state	to	exit	the	Union	only	when	there	is	demonstrable	congruence	between	the	will	of	parliament
(through	its	desire	to	trigger	Article	50)	and	the	will	of	citizens	(through	their	popular	vote).	The	lesson	for	EU
member	states	here	is	to	legally	institute	the	mandatory	referendum	as	the	appropriate	decision-making	procedure
for	leaving	the	EU.	As	the	future	is	unpredictable,	this	is	worth	doing	even	for	those	states	where	there	is	little	or	no
public	desire	to	withdraw	from	the	EU.
The	way	forward	for	the	UK
But	what	of	the	lessons	for	the	UK,	now	that	the	deed	has	been	done?	If	ad	hoc	referendums	are	prone	to	legitimacy
crises,	then	the	wisdom	of	holding	a	second	Brexit	referendum	is	highly	questionable.	Certainly,	any	attempt	by
Parliament	to	force	another	referendum	would	be	delegitimised	in	the	eyes	of	many	who	voted	for	Brexit.	The
perceived	fairness	of	democratic	procedures	is	crucial	to	ensuring	that	democracy	can	do	its	job	of	peacefully
managing	conflict.	Just	how	far	a	tarnished	second	referendum	could	(peacefully)	manage	conflict	is	a	high	stakes
gamble.	This	is	not	a	question	of	a	fair	procedure	being	held	hostage	by	the	threat	of	violence.	It	is	rather	a	question
of	how	we	can	expect	citizens	to	maintain	trust	in	the	fairness	of	democratic	procedures	that	are	uncertain.
On	the	other	hand,	it	might	be	argued	that	a	court	decision	ruling	that	the	European	Act	does	in	fact	require	a
referendum	on	the	Brexit	agreement	would	result	in	a	mandatory	rather	than	an	ad	hoc	referendum.	In	one	sense,
this	is	true.	But	in	another	sense,	if	the	intention	of	the	European	Act	was	to	provide	for	mandatory	referendums
pertaining	to	issues	of	withdrawal,	such	as	the	need	for	a	withdrawal	agreement,	then	the	clarification	of	the	court
would	be	hardly	required.	Any	decision	by	the	court	in	favour	of	a	referendum	on	the	withdrawal	agreement,	where
the	option	to	remain	in	the	EU	was	tabled,	would	be	met	with	no	less	virulence	by	Brexit	supporters	than	if	it	was
proposed	by	Parliament.	The	only	choice	in	a	subsequent	referendum	that	would	be	acceptable	to	many	citizens	is
that	between	what	the	UK	and	EU	actually	agree	in	the	withdrawal	agreement	and	no	deal	whatsoever.
From	the	perspective	of	attempting	to	peacefully	manage	conflict,	if	the	Brexit	vote	is	to	be	revered	or	mitigated	in
some	way	(e.g.	by	remaining	in	the	Customs	Union),	then	it	is	best	done	by	political	representatives.	The	justificatory
force	of	representative	politics	has	a	much	higher	chance	of	success	in	this	regard	than	the	wilful	force	of	yet	another
vote.
_____________
Note:	the	above	is	partly	based	on	arguments	developed	in	the	author’s	article	published	in	the	European	Law
Journal.
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